Ten years since the European Central Bank raised interest rates, only to reverse course within months after Lehman Brothers collapsed and markets seized up, policy makers still are defending their action.

The decision on July 3, 2008, to lift the benchmark rate a quarter point to 4.25 percent was seen by investors as risky, but then-President Jean-Claude Trichet said at the time that it was needed to curb inflation. He also said the 21 Governing Council members were unanimous.

Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell was among those former policy makers who recalled the meeting to Bloomberg.

โ€œLehman was unpredictable. Itโ€™s true that we saw strong credit expansion in the years before, but the systemic crisis couldnโ€™t have been foreseen. Our main objective was to keep inflation expectations anchored, even if growth was slowing somewhat,โ€ said Tumpel-Gugerell, who was a member of the ECB Executive Board from 2003-11.

Inflation was running 4 percent when policy makers met, or more than twice their goal. While it was driven by surging oil prices โ€” the underlying rate excluding energy and food was below 2 percent โ€” the concern was that the pressures were growing.

โ€œInflation is now the No. 1 concern of our 320 million fellow citizens. They are counting on us to be the anchor of price stability in a period which is obviously very demanding. They can count on us. They can have confidence in the fact that the Governing Council of the ECB will do what is necessary,โ€ Jean-Claude Trichet had said at his news conference on July 3, 2008.

George Provopoulos remembered the meeting as his first as governor of the Greek central bank, a job heโ€™d started just two weeks earlier.

โ€œFrom an inflation point of view things looked to be worsening. Thatโ€™s why this decision was taken then. But after a few months, in early September, the Lehman Brothers problem erupted and then suddenly the whole environment changed everywhere worldwide. Then we realized that it was not an American-only crisis, it was an international crisis,โ€ said Provopoulos, a member of the ECB Governing Council from 2008-14.

Three of the current Governing Council members took part in the decision, including President Mario Draghi, who was then governor of the Bank of Italy. Executive Board member Yves Mersch was Luxembourgโ€™s central-bank governor, and Erkki Liikanen headed the Bank of Finland.

The three men, who declined to comment for this story, and their colleagues then watched as Lehman imploded, Bank of America bought a battered Merrill Lynch & Co., and the U.S. government took control of American International Group.

Global markets plunged, lenders were rescued across Europe, and the worldโ€™s major central banks pumped hundreds of billions of euros, dollars and other currencies into the financial system. In a coordinated move in October, the ECB cut its main refinancing rate by half a percentage point โ€” and kept going. By May 2009, it was down to 1 percent.

โ€œThe biggest takeaway is it gives you an indication of how completely blind-sided a lot of the official institutions were about the state of the financial system at the time and therefore the incipient crisis,โ€ said James Nixon, an economist at Societe Generale in 2008 who is now at Oxford Economics. โ€œFrom my own experience as an economist, it wasnโ€™t really on our radar.โ€

There had been warning signs though. The euro-area economy was slowing, and Spain and Ireland were going through a real-estate bust.

The ECBโ€™s Financial Stability Review had a month earlier characterized the outlook as โ€œhighly uncertainโ€ and noted that banks were โ€œretrenching from risk-taking.โ€

The Federal Reserve had reduced U.S. rates seven times in the previous 10 months as it dealt with problems including the collapse of Bear Stearns. The Bank of England had cut its key rate three times in the wake of a run on Northern Rock Plc. Lucas Papademos, who was the ECBโ€™s vice president from 2002 to 2010, also defends the action.

โ€œThe council was of course aware that the economic and financial situation was deteriorating and that there were downside risks to the growth outlook. Nevertheless, the magnitude of those risks was not considered to be very serious and moderate economic growth was expected over the medium term,โ€ he said.

Vitor Constancio was Portugalโ€™s governor at the time, before succeeding Papademos as ECB vice president. That term ended in May, and looking back at 2008 in one of his final speeches, he said policy makers were โ€œoverreactingโ€ to the headline inflation number.